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Título: Evaluación de la credibilidad de relatos de personas con discapaci-
dad intelectual. 
Resumen: El objetivo del presente trabajo consistió en analizar las caracte-
rísticas diferenciales de los relatos emitidos por víctimas reales y simuladas 
con discapacidad intelectual ligera y moderada mediante el procedimiento 
de análisis de credibilidad de Control de la Realidad (RM). Dos evaluadores 
entrenados en los procedimientos de análisis de credibilidad mediante crite-
rios de contenido evaluaron 13 relatos verdaderos y 16 relatos falsos. Los 
resultados encontrados muestran que existen pocas diferencias entre los 
dos tipos de relatos. Los únicos criterios que resultan significativos para 
discriminar entre los dos tipos de relatos son la cantidad de detalles y la 
longitud de las declaraciones espontáneas obtenidas mediante recuerdo li-
bre. Ninguna de las características fenomenológicas examinadas resultó sig-
nificativa para discriminar entre víctimas reales y simuladas. La representa-
ción gráfica mediante visualización hiperdimensional (HDV) considerando 
conjuntamente todos los criterios muestra una gran heterogeneidad entre 
relatos. Un análisis de conglomerados permitió clasificar los dos tipos de re-
latos con una probabilidad de acierto del 68.75  por ciento. 
Palabras clave: Evaluación de credibilidad; discapacidad intelectual; crite-
rios de contenido; testimonio; visualización hiper-dimensional. 
  Abstract: The objective of this study was to analyze the features that dis-
tinguish statements given by actual and simulated victims with mild to 
moderate intellectual disability, using the credibility analysis procedure 
known as Reality Monitoring (RM). Two evaluators trained in credibility 
analysis procedures using content criteria evaluated 13 true statements and 
16 false statements. The results obtained show that there is little difference 
between the two types of statements when analyzed on the basis of content 
criteria using the RM procedure. The only criteria that proved to be signifi-
cant for discriminating between the two types of statements were the 
amount of details and the length of spontaneous statements obtained 
through free recall. None of the phenomenological characteristics studied 
turned out to be significant for discriminating between actual and simulat-
ed victims. Graphic representation using high-dimensional visualization 
(HDV) with all criteria taken into consideration shows that the two types 
of statements are quite heterogeneous. Cluster analysis can group cases 
with a 68.75% chance of accuracy.  
Key words: Credibility assessment; intellectual disability; content criteria; 
eyewitness testimony; high-dimensional visualization. 
 
  Introduction 
 
It has been proposed that lying would be cognitively more 
complex than telling the truth (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 
2006) because it would involve a greater demand for cogni-
tive resources (Vrij & Heaven, 1999). This is reflected in 
some clichés about persons with intellectual disability that 
suggest they would not be capable of making up complex 
lies and, therefore, would be more believable (Bottoms, 
Nysse-Carris, Harris, & Tyda, 2003). These clichés carry a 
negative charge, however, that results in persons with ID be-
ing viewed as witnesses who are less credible and less capa-
ble of giving valid testimony (Henry, Ridley, Perry, & Crane, 
2011; Peled, Iarocci, & Connolly, 2004; Sabsey & Doe, 1991; 
Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003; Tharinger, Horton, & Millea, 1990; 
Valenti-Hein & Schwartz, 1993), which makes persons with 
ID more vulnerable to crimes (González, Cendra, & Man-
zanero, 2013). Peled et al. (2004) explored the perceived 
credibility of young persons with ID who were required to 
give testimony in a legal setting. Half of the observers were 
told beforehand that the witness had moderate intellectual 
disability, and the other half were told that the witness was a 
person who was developmentally normal. When subsequent-
ly questioned about the credibility of the testimonies, they 
stated that those testimonies given by a person with ID were 
considered less credible. Henry et al. (2011) evaluated the 
credibility of children with ID and of developmentally nor-
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mal children and found that the former, because they gave 
fewer details, were less credible than the latter. They found 
no correlation between the credibility evaluations and either 
mental age or anxiety.  
The generally lower credibility attributed to persons with 
ID suggests an enormous need for a technical credibility 
analysis procedure that is adapted for this type of victim so 
that evaluation of their testimony is not left to intuition—
which, on most occasions, is biased (Manzanero, Quintana, 
& Contreras, 2015). Such procedures do not exist at this 
time, however, which means that persons with ID are often 
excluded from the justice system or evaluated on the basis 
of a comparison with children. This situation would be ex-
acerbated by failure to adapt legal and law enforcement pro-
cedures to the abilities of these individuals (Recio, Alemany, 
& Manzanero, 2012). Such adaptations could mitigate this 
serious situation, for it has been shown that, with sufficient 
adaptations, persons with ID are capable of identifying an al-
leged assailant in a line-up (Manzanero, Contreras, Recio, 
Alemany, & Martorell, 2012), even though they do not per-
form as well on this type of task, to begin with, as individu-
als who do not have ID (Manzanero, Recio, Alemany, & 
Martorell, 2011).  
Forensic psychology has proposed various procedures 
for evaluating credibility through analysis of statement con-
tent (Manzanero, 2001). One of these procedures is the Re-
ality Monitoring (RM) technique (Johnson & Raye, 1981; 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) which is suggested 
for evaluating statement credibility.  
RM’s basic assumption is that statements based on 
memories of actual events are qualitatively different from 
statements that are not based on experience or are simply 
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the product of fantasy, as Johnson and Raye (1981) had 
shown. According to the original proposition, actual state-
ments would contain more contextual and sensory infor-
mation and show less allusion to cognitive processes and id-
iosyncratic information than fabricated statements. Many 
who do research in this area have shown this to be an erro-
neous assumption, however, for these differences between 
the two types of statements have not been consistently 
found (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005). 
The theoretical framework for explaining how state-
ments of different origins may be distinguished is found in 
the meta-cognitive reality monitoring processes defined by 
Johnson (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson et al., 1993). 
Based on their proposals, numerous research studies have 
been conducted to explore the characteristics that differenti-
ate statements of varying origin, such as memories of actual 
events, imagination, dreams, fantasies, lies, or false memo-
ries derived from post-event information (Diges, 1995; 
Henkel, Franklin, & Johnson, 2000; Johnson, 1988; Johnson, 
Kahan, & Raye, 1984; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 
1988; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Manzanero, 2006, 2009; 
Manzanero & Diges, 1995; Manzanero, El-Astal, & Aróz-
tegui, 2009; Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986; Suengas & 
Johnson, 1988).  
In a first approximation, Johnson and Raye (1981) pro-
posed that there are four types of essential attributes by 
which we could differentiate between the two types of in-
formation stored in memory. Memories of perceptive origin 
would have more contextual and sensory attributes and 
more semantic details, while self-generated memories would 
contain more information about cognitive operations. As 
subsequent research was expanding the list of differentiating 
attributes (see Table 1), the data was showing, simultaneous-
ly, that the presence of these distinctive features depends on 
the influence of a host of factors.  
 
Table 1. Dimensions of memory descriptions that could be important in 
distinguishing their origin. 
Sensory information 
Details of the spatial and temporal context of the event (internal) 
Details of the environmental context (external) 
Allusions to cognitive processes 
Hesitant expressions 
Irrelevant or superfluous information 
Explanations 
Self-references 
Exaggerations 
Recall perspective 
Personal opinions and comments 
Fillers 
Pauses 
Spontaneous corrections 
Changes of order 
Length of the statement 
 
Among other factors, the presence of characteristic fea-
tures in true statements, as opposed to statements arising 
from imagined or suggested facts, would depend on the ac-
tivation (Diges, Rubio, & Rodríguez, 1992), previous 
knowledge (Diges, 1995), the perceptive modality (Henkel et 
al., 2000), the preparation (Manzanero & Diges, 1995), the 
time delayed (Manzanero, 2006), the individual’s age (Com-
blain, D'Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2005), the asking of 
questions and multiple recall (Manzanero, 1994; Strömwall, 
Bengtsson, Leander, & Granhag, 2004), and contextual fac-
tors (Campos & Alonso-Quecuty, 1998), as well as the type 
of design used in the research conducted (Bensi, Gambetti, 
Nori, & Giusberti, 2009).  
On the other hand, the wide variability in memory origin 
means that the characteristics differentiating fantasies, lies, 
dreams, and post-event information are not the same. Even 
for each modality, however, there are varying degrees of re-
move from the actual information. For example, changing a 
small detail of an actual event—even a very important detail, 
such as whether the role played in the event was witness or 
protagonist—is not the same thing as fabricating the entire 
event (Manzanero, 2009).   In any case, false statements are 
never entirely fabricated but originate, in part, from infor-
mation perceived from different sources that is re-elaborated 
to create a new statement. Likewise, characteristics of the 
statements could vary in relation to the participant’s ability 
to generate a plausible statement. 
Some previous studies have shown that criteria tradition-
ally used to distinguish actual victims from simulated vic-
tims, such as the emotions associated with their statements, 
would not be useful with the ID population (Manzanero, 
Recio, Alemany, & Pérez-Castro, 2013). We are not aware, 
however, of any study on the characteristics that differenti-
ate true statements from false statements in this population. 
This was the reason for conducting the following experi-
ment: to analyze the differences between statements given 
by actual and simulated victims with ID, using the features 
proposed under the framework of Reality Monitoring (RM) 
processes—the ultimate purpose being to develop proce-
dures adapted for these victims.  
Previous research studies (Manzanero, López, & Aróz-
tegui, submitted) using participants with no intellectual disa-
bility, who were asked to assume the perspective of either 
false protagonist or actual bystander for an automobile acci-
dent, showed that the former were more heterogeneous, 
phenomenologically, than the latter, although the two types 
of statements differed on very few points (Figure 1). The 
hope was that similar results would be obtained in this study.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Twenty-nine persons with intellectual disability partici-
pated in the study. Thirteen of the participants were actual 
victims, with a mean IQ of 60.72 (SD=9.67) and a mean 
chronological age of 35.18 years (SD=7.16), and sixteen 
were simulated victims, with a mean IQ of 59.30 (SD=9.44) 
and a mean chronological age of 33.75 years (SD=6.78). 
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Figure 1. HDV graph of the content criteria for true statements (black dots) 
and false statements (white dots), with all content criteria taken into account. 
Correct classification = 94.3%. Sammon’s error = .034. (Manzanero et al., 
submitted) 
 
Procedure 
 
To conduct this research, a real event was chosen that 
happened two years ago—a day trip taken by a group of per-
sons with ID from the Carmen Pardo-Valcarce Foundation, 
during which the bus they were traveling in caught fire. A 
researcher selected the participants, all of comparable IQ, on 
the basis of criteria for the ―true‖ group—did go on the day 
trip—and the ―false‖ group—did not go on the day trip but 
knew about the event from references made to it. All per-
sons with ID who participated in the study (or their legal 
guardians) signed a consent for voluntary participation. Each 
of the persons with ID was given instructions and informed 
of the purpose of the research. In addition, those partici-
pants who did not go on the day trip were given a summary 
of the most important information about the trip, such as 
the location, the trip’s primary complication, and how the 
day went. We increased the ecological validity of our study 
by encouraging all participants in the two groups to do their 
best when giving their testimony. However, to avoid putting 
them under too much pressure to make the interviewer be-
lieve their testimony, we chose an incentive that was not 
stressful—they would be invited for a soda if they succeeded 
in convincing the interviewer that they had, in fact, experi-
enced the event. In addition, the persons with ID who be-
longed to the false statement group were told explicitly that 
they had the option to lie and were assured there would be 
no negative consequences if they did so, thereby preventing 
undue tension.  
Two ―blind‖ researchers, experts at interviewing and tak-
ing testimony, interviewed each participant individually. An 
audiovisual recording was made of all interviews. The same 
instructions were given for all interviews conducted: ―We 
want you to tell us what happened when you went on the 
day trip and the bus caught fire… from beginning to end, 
with as much detail as you can give. We want you to tell us 
even things that you might think are not very important.‖ 
Once the free statement was obtained, all participants were 
asked the same questions: Who were you with? Where was 
it? Where were you going? What did you yourself do? and 
What happened afterwards? The interviews were conducted 
in random order.   
The interview tapes were transcribed to facilitate analysis 
of the phenomenological characteristics of the statements, 
with any reference to the participant’s group eliminated. 
Two trained evaluators assessed each statement individually 
on each of the content criteria proposed in the RM proce-
dure (see Table 2), and then an interjudge agreement was 
reached. The degree of agreement between encoders [AI = 
agreements / (agreements + disagreements)] for all meas-
urements analyzed was greater than .80 (Tversky, 1977).   
For correcting amount of detail, a chart was made of the 
micropropositions, describing as objectively as possible what 
happened in the actual event. 
The remaining measurements are defined as follows: 
- sensory information: information referring to sensory and ge-
ographical data that appeared in reality: colors, sizes, posi-
tions…  
- contextual information: information referring to spatial and 
temporal data about the area where the accident took place 
- allusions to cognitive processes: information in which some cog-
nitive process is explicitly mentioned: I imagined, I saw, I 
heard, I remember… my attention was focused on, some-
thing makes me think… 
- hesitant expressions: implies doubt about what is being de-
scribed (it could be, it seems that, I think that, it’s likely...) 
- irrelevant information: information that is correct but is not a 
central part of the event  
- explanations: information that expands upon the description 
of the facts by providing a functional reference 
- self-references: references the participant makes to himself 
when describing the event 
- exaggerations: descriptions that, by being excessive or lack-
ing, distort the facts 
- personal opinions and comments: assessments of aspects of the 
event and the participant’s personal additions 
- Fillers: pet words or phrases that are repeated out of habit 
throughout the statement 
- pauses: silences during the participant’s narration of the 
facts 
- spontaneous corrections: corrections occurring in the descrip-
tion of the facts 
- changes of order: alteration of the event’s natural order of oc-
currence: introduction, development, and conclusion 
- length: number of words in the statement 
 
All measurements, with the exception of length, were 
measured by counting the number of times each one oc-
curred in the statements. 
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Results 
 
Factorial analysis (ANOVA) of the content criteria proposed 
in RM showed that only amount of detail [F(1.31)=19.800, p 
<.01, η2=.398, 1-β=.990] and length of statement 
[F(1.31)=5.526, p <.05, η2 =.156, 1-β =.624] were significant. 
There were no significant effects on the rest of the criteria. 
Table 2 shows the mean scores and standard deviations for 
false statements and true statements and the totals for each 
criterion. 
 
Table 2. Mean and standard deviation for content criteria and effect size 
(R2), in relation to statement origin. 
 
False 
Statement 
True 
Statement 
Total  
 M SD M SD M SD R2 
Amount of 
detail ** 
7.35 3.60 13.93 4.74 10.43 5.29 .398 
Sensory in-
formation 
1.11 1.72 1.53 1.64 1.31 1.67 .016 
Contextual 
information 
3.70 1.49 4.80 1.89 4.21 1.75 .100 
Cognitive 
processes 
0.47 1.00 0.66 1.04 0.56 1.01 .010 
Hesitant ex-
pressions 
1.35 1.27 2.03 1.75 1.67 1.53 .051 
Irrelevant in-
formation  
0.17 0.52 0.40 0.82 0.28 0.68 .028 
Explanations 0.52 0.51 0.93 1.33 0.71 0.99 .043 
Self-
references 
5.17 4.55 7.60 8.02 6.31 6.42 .037 
Exaggerations 0.05 0.24 0.20 0.56 0.12 0.42 .029 
Opinions / 
comments 
0.94 1.02 1.40 1.24 1.15 1.14 .042 
Fillers  7.29 6.44 6.46 7.42 6.90 6.82 .004 
Pauses 9.76 7.22 20.26 21.92 14.68 16.50 .104 
Corrections 0.17 0.39 0.13 0.35 0.15 0.36 .004 
Changes of 
order 
0.76 0.90 1.26 1.27 1.00 1.10 .053 
Length* 144.11 75.14 249.06 166.07 193.31 134.91 .156 
** Significant effects p <.01; * significant effects p <.05. 
 
As a way to appreciate the differences between the two 
types of statements, with all the measurements analyzed tak-
en into consideration, the data was represented graphically 
through a high-dimensional visualization (HDV) technique 
used in other studies (Buja et al., 2008; Manzanero et al., 
2009; Steyvers, 2002), and a cluster analysis was performed 
to classify participants into two groups. 
As may be appreciated from the graph in Figure 2, one 
possible explanation for the scant difference between the 
two types of statements stems from intersubject variability, 
which would indicate that this technique has low diagnostic 
capability. If we tried to classify the two types of statements 
based on all the phenomenological characteristics considered 
in the RM technique, K-Means Cluster Analysis grouped 25 
cases as false and 7 as true. When cluster A is considered 
equal to simulation and B equal to actual, the false state-
ments were correctly classified in 16 cases (94.1% of total 
false statements), while true statements were correctly classi-
fied in 6 cases (40% of total true statement). As may be ob-
served in HDV graph, the main reason is that the actual vic-
tims’ statements are more heterogeneous than the simulated 
victims’ statements—for those of the former group are, 
phenomenologically, more similar to those of the latter 
group, in some cases.  
 
 
Figure 2. HDV graph of the content criteria for true statements (white 
dots) and false statements (black dots), with all content criteria taken into 
account. Sammon’s error = .013. 
 
When cluster groups are considered, factorial analysis 
(ANOVA) of the content criteria proposed in RM showed 
that amount of detail [F(1.31)=16.375, p <.01, η2=.353, 1-
β=.975], explanations [F(1.31)=5.218, p <.05, η2=.148, 1-
β=.599], self-references [F(1.31)=5.449, p <.05, η2=.154, 1-
β=.618], exaggerations [F(1.31)=5.300, p <.05, η2=.150, 1-
β=.606], pauses [F(1.31)=7.320, p <.05, η2=.196, 1-β=.745], 
and length of statement [F(1.31)=64.663, p <.01, η2=.683, 1-
β=.1.000] were significant (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Mean and standard deviation for content criteria and effect size 
(R2), in relation to cluster groups 
 Cluster A Cluster B  
 M SD M SD R2 
Amount of detail ** 8.80 4.36 16.28 4.15 .332 
Sensory information 1.04 1.48 2.28 2.05 .068 
Contextual information 3.96 1.81 5.14 1.21 .049 
Cognitive processes 0.44 1.00 1.00 1.00 .022 
Hesitant expressions 1.58 1.44 2.00 1.91 .020 
Irrelevant information  0.20 0.50 0.57 1.13 .021 
Explanations * 0.52 0.58 1.42 1.71 .120 
Self-references * 5.00 4.18 11.00 10.51 .125 
Exaggerations * 0.04 0.20 0.42 0.78 .122 
Opinions / comments 1.04 1.13 1.57 1.13 .006 
Fillers  6.20 6.42 9.42 8.10 .007 
Pauses * 10.88 11.23 28.28 25.03 .169 
Corrections 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.37 -.033 
Changes of order * 0.76 0.83 1.85 1.57 .146 
Length** 135.24 63.50 400.71 116.92 .673 
** Significant effects p <.01; * significant effects p <.05. 
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Conclusions 
 
As noted in the introduction, there is an abundance of litera-
ture that points out inconsistencies in the attributes differen-
tiating true statements from false statements, as well as the 
irrelevance of RM procedure criteria, on the whole, for dis-
tinguishing between true and false statements. Likewise, 
from the results obtained in this study, we can conclude that 
the above-mentioned technique is also not valid for distin-
guishing between statements given by actual and simulated 
victims with ID. The lack of effect on most of the criteria 
would be due to an enormous variability and, in some cases, 
to the floor effect for, generally speaking, the statements 
were not very rich, phenomenologically.  
Of the 15 criteria analyzed, however, there were two 
(amount of detail and length) that were significant for dis-
criminating between the two types of statements and, there-
fore, could be of some help in distinguishing the origin of 
the statements. Thus, the temptation would be to use only 
these two criteria for an objective analysis of credibility and 
to discard the remaining criteria.  
This approach, which would mean fewer criteria, should 
be discarded, however, because whether these two criteria 
are present most likely depends on a great variety of factors, 
such as the type of event described, the time elapsed, and 
the witness’s abilities, for example. If the criteria that enable 
us to distinguish between true and false statements are the 
amount of detail and the length of the statement—the first 
also being especially important in evaluating a testimony as 
―true‖—what happens with all those individuals who have 
limited vocabulary, semantic and autobiographical memory 
deficits (without which they cannot satisfactorily reproduce 
conversations), or difficulty situating events in a given con-
text? The majority of persons with ID have trouble relating a 
vivid event in rich detail; they tend to be even less likely than 
the population without ID to include important details of 
the event (Dent, 1986; Kebbell & Wagstaff, 1997; Perlman, 
Ericson, Esses, & Isaacs, 1994).  
By the same token, many persons with ID also have 
great difficulty situating events in time and space (Bailey et 
al., 2004; Landau & Zukowsky, 2003). Therefore, using only 
the two criteria shown to be significant in the study, one 
runs the risk of issuing an erroneous assessment of credibil-
ity—and the revictimization that would result.  
Discarding the 13 non-significant criteria does not seem 
appropriate either, however, for as the cluster analysis of all 
criteria shows, we would still be able to distinguish 68.75% 
of the statements correctly, even though they vary widely. 
The problem is that, even with sound decision-making abil-
ity, it is difficult to take 15 criteria into consideration simul-
taneously—and, in any case, there is an 60% chance of a 
false positive. Let us remember that, in forensic psychology, 
the proposed maximum rate of error for a technique to be 
accepted as valid is 0.4% (Manzanero & Muñoz, 2011; 
Rassin, 1999; Wagenaar, Van Koppen, & Crombag, 1993). 
Further research with these criteria, along with a system 
of analysis that would enable all indicators to be taken into 
account in making a decision, might shed more light on con-
tent-based lie detection procedures.  
These results, however, are contrary to those found in 
the previous research mentioned in the introduction, which 
was conducted with developmentally normal persons (Man-
zanero, et al., submitted), where the dispersion of points on 
the graph was observed to be greater for statements given by 
participants assuming the perspective of false protagonist 
than for those assuming the actual perspective (see Figure 
1). In that study, in contrast to this one, the two types of 
statements could be distinguished with a 94.3% chance of 
accuracy. At any rate, this difference in the results could be 
accounted for by differences between the two studies in 
terms of not only the participants but also the events—for 
an actual event was used for the present study, but a filmed 
event and a different type of fabrication was used for the 
study with participants who did not have ID. It would be 
advisable to conduct further research with different events 
and different types of fabrication so that the results could be 
generalized. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
Although the individuals available to us for the sample 
were persons with mild and moderate ID—the deficit seen 
in 80% and 10%, respectively, of persons with ID (Fletcher, 
Loschen, Stavrakaki, & First, 2007)—we are adamant that 
there is a need for research in this field with the group of 
persons who have greater difficulty giving their testimony. 
In future research studies, testimonies given by persons with 
more severe ID should be analyzed on the basis of these cri-
teria because we understand that, the more severe the disa-
bility, the more difficult it is for the individual to narrate 
with sufficient detail, to situate an event in a context, and to 
reproduce conversations. Thus, in a population of persons 
with severe ID or with a specific syndrome involving lan-
guage disorders, perhaps the credibility criteria that prove to 
be significant for distinguishing between true and false 
statements would be different. 
Then again, the results obtained would be applicable on-
ly to those statements originating from an actual memory 
and to false statements generated from information about an 
event presented schematically. Research on persons with ID 
would have to be expanded to include other types of state-
ments, such as those arising from false memories or those 
originating in the imagination. In any case, false statements, 
regardless of their origin, are never entirely fabricated but 
originate, in part, from various sources of information and 
are developed to create something new.  
In conclusion, in light of our results, we may affirm that 
there are complexities involved in analyzing the credibility of 
testimony given by an adult person with ID and, even be-
yond that, in designing the supportive procedures required 
to obtain a valid testimony. Given the bias that may condi-
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tion our intuitive credibility evaluation in persons with ID, 
and because such an evaluation carries a significant margin 
of error, it is absolutely essential that, in a law enforcement 
or legal setting, individuals who specialize in ID would be on 
hand when the testimony of a person with ID is to be evalu-
ated. By the same token, prior to evaluating the testimony, 
the individual must be evaluated with regard to those abili-
ties that could impact each of the credibility criteria used to 
distinguish between true and fabricated statements in this 
population. 
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